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Abstract: This paper presents a simple model of a common access shery where shermen
care about relative performance as well as absolute prots. Our specication captures the
idea that status (which depends on relative performance) in a community inuences a per-
son's well-being. We consider two alternative specications of relative performance. In our
rst specication, relative performance is equated to relative after-tax prots. In our second
specication, it is relative harvests that matter. We show that overharvesting resulting from
the tragedy of the commons problem is exacerbated by the desire for higher relative perfor-
mance, leading to a smaller steady-state sh stock and smaller steady-state prot for all the
shermen. We examine a tax package, consisting of a tax on relative prot and a tax on
eort, and an individual quota as alternatives to implement the socially ecient equilibrium.
JEL-Classication: D62, Q20, Q50.
Keywords: Relative Income, Relative Performance, Status, Fishery, Tragedy of the Com-
mons.
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11 Introduction
The tragedy of the commons has long been recognized in the sheries (Gordon, 1954,
Hardin, 1968) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation has reported that, in 2007, 80%
of stocks are shed at or beyond their maximum sustainable yield (FAO, 2009). Recent
empirical work by McWhinnie (2009) found that shared stocks are indeed more prone to
overexploitation, conrming the theoretical prediction based on a dynamic game model of
Clark and Munro (1975), that an increase in the number of players reduces the equilibrium
stock level. Fisheries managers are tackling this problem with a variety of instruments includ-
ing quotas, licences and cooperative management.1 Of note is that management instruments
are generally quantity-based (quotas or permits) rather than price-based (taxes).
In this paper we add another factor that reduces the equilibrium stock level: the degree
of concern about one's status, as reected in a measure of relative performance. We measure
relative performance in two ways: rstly by relative after-tax prots; and subsequently by
relative harvest. We do this within the context of a standard, dynamic sheries model as
this allows us to clearly demonstrate the impact of a relative performance distortion on the
equilibrium stock level. Importantly, it also allows us to evaluate quantity- and price-based
policy responses in this multiple-externality situation.
In our model, agents act in their own best interests when harvesting from a common-
pool resource. What diers from the standard Clark-Munro model is that, instead of simply
maximising prots, our agents also care about status and thus they maximise utility which
is a function of both own prot and performance relative to the average. We nd that this
relative performance distortion exacerbates the tragedy of the commons by providing yet
another reason to overharvest.
We also consider policy responses that would achieve the social planner's solution. We
show that in this case of two externalities, an individual quota system may be preferred to a
tax system. This is due to the problem discussed in Baumol and Oates (1988) that multiple
1See Hilborn et. al. (2005) for a survey of successes and failures.
2externalities require multiple tax instruments for resolution. This provides some support
for the use of quantity instruments (such as quotas or permits) when multiple externalities
exist, as may be the case for a variety of environmental and natural resource issues.
The facts that relative performance reects one's status in the community, and that status
matters, have been well recognized in the theoretical and empirical literature on interper-
sonal comparison. Schoeck (1966) discusses the role of envy in social behavior; Boskin and
Sheshinski (1978) show that when agents care about relative income, an optimal redistribu-
tive tax must be designed dierently; Rayo and Becker (2007) argue that evolutionary forces
favor happiness that depends on relative performance. Empirical research by Neumark and
Postlewaite (1998) shows relative income consideration is an important factor that inuences
the decision of women to joint the work force; using U.S. data, Luttmer (2005) nds that
the levels of wellbeing of individuals, as reected by several indicators, depend on relative
income.2
In the natural resource literature, Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009) have shown that
relative consumption concerns can cause agents to over-exploit renewable resources even
when these are private properties. They also model the common access case, where there
is a continuum of agents. Our model is dierent from theirs, in that we consider a nite
number of agents playing a Cournot dynamic game, taking into account the eect of the
shing eort of other agents on the evolution of the stock, in other words, we are dealing
with a dierential game of shery with status concerns.3
In sheries specically, anecdotal evidence suggests that status matter, particularly with
respect to harvest. Some examples include a captain being red for having the lowest har-
vests, simple statements at meetings proposing management change such as \I like shing
2Research on status concerns has also been applied to environmental economics. See Ng and Wang (1993),
Howarth (1996, 2000, 2006), Brekke and Howarth (2002). There is also some relationship to the literature
following Baumol (1958) where market share matters.
3See Dockner et al. (2000) for a comprehensive guide to dierential games in economics. Our paper uses,
as equilibrium concept, the open-loop Nash equilibrium for analytical simplicity. For recent papers that
use this solution concept, see Sorger (2002), Benchekroun et al. (2009, 2010), and Bernard et al. (2008).
The alternative concept of Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, while attractive, typically requires extensive
numerical approximation of the value function (except for a very small class of games with special structures).
3because it means going out each day to see if I can catch more than the next guy", and
shermen transferring the race-to-sh to species that are not covered by quota management
or converting it to seeing how fast they can catch their quota to say they had a \golden day"
or a \big score".4
2 The Model
The basis for our model is Clark and Munro's (1975) dynamic, single species model. That is,
we consider a sh stock exploited by n symmetric shermen who live in the same community.
They do not coordinate their harvesting decision. We assume that the sh is sold in a larger
market, so that the aggregate quantity of sh they catch does not inuence the market price,
which we assume to be a constant p: Let xt denote the stock size and Lit the eort level of
agent i at time t. Following Schaefer (1957) the harvested amount is qit = qxtLit where q
is the catchability coecient. Individual eorts cannot exceed the maximum level L. Eort
cost is c per unit. Agent i's prot at time t is
it = pqxtLit   cLit
Now, we diverge from the standard model and suppose that agents care about relative prot
as well as absolute prot.5 The relative prot of agent i is






We assume the agent's utility function is a concave function of a weighted average of absolute




[(1   )it + Rit]
1  (1)
4We thank contacts in the Australian sheries community for providing these anecdotes.
5Our formulation measures status relative to the average of all other players. An alternative would be to
consider the desire to be the best and hence measure status relative to the maximum of all other players. In
the symmetric equilibrium used here, these measures are the same.
4where  2 [0;1) is the elasticity of marginal utility.6 The special case  = 0 implies linear
utility. The analysis that follows admits both the linear utility case ( = 0) and the concave
utility case ( > 0). In fact, as will be seen below, the value of  does not aect the steady
state stock, it only aects the transition path to the steady state.
Player i takes the natural growth of the sh stock and others' eort levels (Ljt, j 6= i,































where r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the natural maximum stock size. We assume
pqK > c.
Taking into account the constraints Lit  0 and L Lit  0, we append the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier t  0 and t  0 and write the Lagrangian function for player i
























Taking rst-order conditions and considering the symmetric Nash equilibrium we nd
that the steady-state stock ~ x is characterised by the following modied golden-rule, which
equates the discount rate with the return from leaving another sh in the ocean, distorted
6An alternative interpretation of this formulation is to consider uit as representing a welfare function over
two agents, a rm owner who cares about absolute prot and a captain who cares about relative prot, or
harvest as considered in Section 4. Then (1   ) and  represent the weights in the welfare function from
some predetermined bargaining game for example. (This is a familiar problem in the theory of the rm when
ownership and control are separated, see, for example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1989).)
5by common access and status concerns:7









































Equation 4 clearly indicates how open access (n > 1) and status concerns ( > 0) distort
the optimal investment equation; both lead to lower equilibrium stock levels. The intuition
is that if the social planner's optimal stock were to be achieved without corrective taxes
or quotas, both open-access and relative income distortions would require individuals to be
more patient, that is, have a lower discount rate, .
Lemma 1: Assume that  is suciently small so that the expression n(pqx c)+c pqx





. Then there exists a unique steady state stock ~ x
that satises the (distorted) modied golden-rule (4).
Proof: See Appendix, Proof 2.
Proposition 1: An increase in the degree of concern for relative income leads to a lower
steady-state stock, and hence lower steady-state prot.
Proof: See Appendix, Proof 3.
3 Policy Responses
We now turn to examining the use of taxes or quotas to eliminate externalities due to
common access and status concerns. One might think that this would depend on whether
the social planner should include in the social welfare function the relative income concerns
of the individuals, i.e., should  appear in the social welfare function? It turns out, however,
that since individuals are identical and relative status takes the additive form (rather than
the ratio), it is immaterial whether the social welfare function includes  or not. To see this,
suppose that the social planner attaches a weight  2 [0;1] to the individual's status concern
. The case  = 0 signies that the planner does not think that envy should be part of the
7See Appendix, Proof 1.
6social welfare, while the case  = 1 signies that the planner allows individual envy to be
reected in social welfare.





























and the usual inequality constraints on Lit. Because of concavity and symmetry, in the social
optimum individuals will exert identical amounts of eort, and hence the problem reduces
















Setting up the maximisation problem and taking rst order conditions, it is easy to verify
that the steady-state stock of this social welfare maximization problem, x; satises the






















This expression is independent of  and  for all  2 [0;1) and  2 [0;1].
3.1 Taxes as a Solution
Now let us see how the social optimum can be replicated by the market outcome with a
suitably designed tax system. To correct both the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) distortion
and the Relative Income distortion (RID) we require two taxes. Thus, let us consider an
input tax on eort (Lit) at the rate  and a tax on relative prot at the rate .9 Agent i's
8See Appendix, Proof 4.
9A sales tax on p is almost identical to the input tax due to the Schaefer production function used.
Putting the relative prot tax on after-input-tax prot is very similar, see Footnote 12.











where net prot of rm i, net
it , is gross prot minus a tax on relative gross prot minus the
input tax, that is:

net



















































We retain our prior assumptions regarding a concave utility function, which depends on































Setting up the maximisation problem and taking rst order conditions once again, the sym-
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10See Appendix, Proof 5.








Clearly, combining the single agent case with the elimination of all behavioural and tax
distortions gives us the social optimum equation (7).11 Thus we can see that rectifying the
relative income distortion with a relative prot tax is simply a matter of nding an optimal
tax () such that the RID with Tax term is zero. Once the relative income distortion is
dealt with, the problem reverts to a eort tax to counteract the standard Tragedy of the
Commons distortion: the optimal eort tax rate, , is dened to convert the ToC with Tax
term to that of the social planners modied golden rule (7).12
Proposition 2 To achieve eciency by means of taxation when faced with both a Tragedy
of the Commons and a relative income distortion, two taxes are required: a tax on relative
prot, and a tax on input (eort).




n   1 + 
(13)
It is an increasing function of  and of n. As n ! 1,  ! : As  ! 1,  ! 1.
(ii) The optimal tax rate on input is














Proof: See Appendix, Proof 6.
3.2 Quotas as a Solution
The previous section showed that the result from Baumol and Oates (1988) that two taxes
are required to correct the two distortions applies to our case of a status externality and
a commons externality. In this case, a quota may be a simpler solution as it requires just
11This can be achieved by setting n = 1 and o = 0.
12Putting the relative prot tax on after-input-tax prot just means that o can be replaced with  in all
these equations.
9one instrument to implement the social planner's optimum. The social planner only needs
to nd the harvest associated with the optimal stock from his modied golden rule (7) and




















The apparent simplicity of quota over taxes seems to indicate that quotas should be
the preferred instrument. However, our model contains no uncertainty of any kind. Once
uncertainty is introduced, and given that the tax rates or the quotas normally must be set
before the uncertainty is resolved, which instrument is better would depend a great deal on
the nature of the uncertainty, see for example Weitzman (1974, 2002).
4 Relative performance in terms of relative harvest
Now we turn to the case where each agent cares about his after-tax prot and his relative
performance in terms of harvest size. The relative performance of player i is now






As relative performance is measured by quantity rather than value, the tax mechanism must
be similarly denominated. Thus, we assume that agent i must pay an in-kind tax or \harvest
tribute" equal to TRit where T is the tribute rate. Agent i must also pay an an eort tax










it is his net prot, i.e. the revenue from his net harvest, qxLi   TRit, minus the
eort cost inclusive of eort tax:

net
it = p(qxLi   TRit)   c(1 + )Lit
This gives rise to agent i's maximisation problem over own prot and relative harvest,






































Taking rst-order conditions, the symmetric, steady-state stock, ~ x, satises the tax- and
































pq~ x(T(1   )p   )q~ x
[(1   )((1   T)pq~ x   c(1 + )) + q~ x][pq~ x   c(1 + )]
| {z }
Relative Harvest Distortion with Tribute
(16)
Now the social planner's objective is to choose the optimal tax, , and tribute, T  such
that the distorted golden rule equation (16) becomes the socially optimal equation (7). This
can be achieved by choosing the optimal tribute T  to eliminate the Relative Harvest Distortion
with Tribute term and then choosing the optimal eort tax  to equate the ToC with Tax
term to the last term in Equation 7.
Proposition 3 To achieve eciency by means of monetary and in-kind taxes when faced
with both a Tragedy of the Commons and a relative harvest distortion, both a tax on input
(eort) and a tribute on relative harvest are required.














Proof: See Appendix, Proof 8.
13See Appendix, Proof 7.
115 Conclusion
This paper considers an additional factor that exacerbates overshing: how much ones cares
about relative, as well as absolute, income. We nd that incorporating status into a sh-
erman's utility function leads to a distortion to the optimal investment equation resulting
in an even lower equilibrium stock level than the usual Tragedy of the Commons distortion
in a standard economic model of the shery with open-access. This result holds when sta-
tus is measured either in terms of relative prot or in terms of relative harvest. We show
that a quota system may be simpler to implement to achieve the social planner's optimal
solution compared to two linear taxes. This result complements work in other multiple ex-
ternality situations such as market power or trade distortions combined with pollution. We




The necessary conditions of Equation 3 are
(pqxt   c)
1 (Lit   Ljt)





= 0, L   Lit  0











  q(Lit + (n   1)Ljt)

=  ( _  t  t) (A.2)
We consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all agents use the same strategies.
Let us focus on the steady-state, where _ xt = 0 = _  t. Steady-state variables are marked with


















(We assume that L > r=(nq), so that the solution is interior, i.e., ~ L < L for ~ x < K). From




(which implies ~  = ~  = 0) and ~ x, we get
~   =
(pq~ x   c)1 
q~ x[(1   )~ L] (A.4)
From steady-state _  t = 0 with ~ L and ~ x,
 ~   = [(pq~ x   c)(1   )~ L]











Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.5), we get
 =
(pq~ x   c) pq((1   )~ L)q~ x










which can be rearranged to get Equation (4). 
13Proof 2:


















Denote the right-hand side of (A.6) by (x;):Then the curve (x;) (for a given ) is




and (x;) ! 1 as x ! c
pq and it is negative









= (~ x;):  (A.7)
Proof 3:












, @=@ < 0 and @=@x < 0: 
Proof 4:











































=  ( _ t   t) (A.10)
We now focus on the symmetric, steady-state, interior solutions, where _ xt = 0 = _ t, and











14and imply from equation (A.9)

 =
(1   )1 (pqx   c)1 (L) 
qx (A.12)
and from equation (A.10)

 = [(pqx
















Substituting (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.13) gives the social planner's modied golden rule. 
Proof 5:
Taking into account the constraints Lit  0 and L Lit  0, we append the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier t  0 and t  0 and write the Lagrangian function for player i






























(pqxt   c)Lit   cLit  





(pqxt   c)Ljt + cLjt
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  q(Lit + (n   1)Ljt)

=  ( _  t    t) (A.16)
Denoting variables satisfying a symmetric, steady-state equilibrium with a tilde, we nd the










15and from equation (A.15)
~   =
 










(1   )pq~ L
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  nq~ L (A.19)
Substituting (A.17) and (A.18) into (A.19) and dening o as in (12), gives the the tax-
augmented, relative-income-distorted modied golden rule (11). 
Proof 6:
To prove part (i) we must nd where the RID with Tax term is zero. That is:






n   1 + 
(A.20)






















n(pq~ x   (1 + o)c)
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The necessary conditions are
V
 





= 0, L   Lit  0






















=   t [G
0   q(Lit + (n   1)Ljt)]   ( _  t    t)
Assuming an interior and symmetric solution, these conditions give the steady state
condition
f(1   )[p(1   T)qx   c(1 + )] + qxg( + G
0 + nqL)

















Comparing the modied golden rule equation (16) with the steady-state condition under







17leaving the Tragedy of the Commons distortion to be eliminated by setting
1
n(pq~ x   c(1 + ))
=
1
pq~ x   c
(A.27)





[1] Alvarez-Cuadrado, F. and N. V. Long (2009), \ Relative Consumption and Renew-
able Resource Extraction under Alternative Property-Rights Regimes," Working Paper,
McGill University.
[2] Baumol, W. J. (1958), On the Theory of Oligopoly, Economica, 25(99), 187-198.
[3] Baumol, W. J. and W. E. Oates (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[4] Benchekroun, H., A. Halsema, and C. Withagen (2009), \On Nonrenewable Resource
Oligopolies: The Asymmetric Case," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
33:1867-1879.
[5] Benchekroun, H., A. Halsema, and C. Withagen (2010), \When Additional Resource
Stocks Reduce Welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 59(1):
109-114.
[6] Bernard, A., A. Haurie, M. Vielle, and L. Viguier (2008), \A Two-Level Dynamic Game
of Carbon Emission Trading between Russia, China, and Annex B Countries," Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 32: 1830-1856.
[7] Boskin, M. J. and E. Sheshinski (1978), \ Optimal Redistributive Taxation When In-
dividual Welfare Depends on Relative Income", Quarterly Journal of Economics 92,
589-601.
[8] Brekke, K. A., and R. B. Howarth (2002), Status, Growth and the Environment, Edward
Elgard, Cheltenham, UK.
[9] Brekke, K. A., and R. B. Howarth, and K. Nyborg (2003), Status-seeking and material
auence: evaluating the Hirsch hypothesis, Ecological Economics 45, 29-39.
19[10] Clark, A.E. and A.J. Oswald (1996), \Satisfaction and Comparison Income," Journal
of Public Economics, 61, 359-381.
[11] Clark, C. W. (1990), Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renew-
able Resources, Second Edition, New York, Wiley.
[12] Clark, C. W. and G. R. Munro (1975), \The Economics of Fishing and Modern Capital
Theory", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2, pp 92-106.
[13] Corneo, G. and O.Jeanne (2001), \ Status, the Distribution of Wealth, and Growth,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 103, 283-293.
[14] Dockner, E., N.V. Long, S. Jorgensen, and G. Sorger (2000), Dierential Games in
Economics and Management Sciences, Cambridge University Press.
[15] Food and Agriculture Organization (2009) The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture
2008 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, Rome.
[16] Gordon, H. Scott (1954), \Economic Theory of Common Property Resources," Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. 62(2), 124-142.
[17] Hardin, G. (1968), \The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, 1243-8.
[18] Hilborn, R., J.M. Orensanz, and A.M. Parma (2005) \Institutions, Incentives and the
Future of Fisheries." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 360, 47-57.
[19] Holmstrom B.R. and Tirole J. (1989) \The theory of the rm", in R. Schmalensee and
R. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pp 61-133.
[20] Howarth, R.B. (1996), \Status Eects and Environmental Externalities," Ecological
Economics, Vol. 16, 25-34.
20[21] Howarth, R.B. (2000), \Climate Change and Relative Consumption", in E. Jochem,
D. Bouille, and J. Sathaye (eds), Society, Behavior, and Climate Change Mitigation,
Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp 191-206.
[22] Howarth, R.B. (2006),\Optimal Environmental Taxes under Relative Consumption Ef-
fects," Ecological Economics 58, 209-219.
[23] Luttmer, E. (2005), \Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 963-1002.
[24] McWhinnie, S. F. (2009), \The Tragedy of the Commons in International Fisheries: An
Emprical Investigation", Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 57, pp
312-333.
[25] Neumark, D. and A. Postlewaite (1998), \Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in
Married Women's Employment," Journal of Public Economics, 70. 157-183.
[26] Ng, Y.K., (1987), Relative Income Eects and the Appropriate Level of of Public Ex-
penditure, Oxford Economic Papers, 39, 293-300.
[27] Ng, Y.K. and J. Wang (1993), Relative Income, Aspiration, Environmental Quality,
Individual and Political Myopia: Why May the Rat Race for Material Growth be Welfare
Reducing? Mathematical Social Sciences, 26, 3-23.
[28] Rayo, L. and G. S. Becker (2007), \Evolutionary Eciency and Happiness," Journal of
Political Economy, 115, 302-337.
[29] Schoeck, H. (1966), Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, Glenny and Ross (trans.), New
York: Harcourt, Brace.
[30] Schaefer, M. B. (1957), \Some Considerations of Population Dynamics and Economics
in Relation to the Management of Marine Fisheries," The Fisheries Research Board of
Canada, Vol. 14, 669-81.
21[31] Solnick, S. and D. Hemenway (1998), \Is More Always Better? A Survey on Positional
Concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 37, 373-383.
[32] Sorger, G. (2002), \On the Long-run Distribution of Capital in the Ramsey Model,"
Journal of Economic Theory 105: 226-243.
[33] Weitzman, M. (1974), \Prices vs Quantities", Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 41(4),
477-91.
[34] Weitzman, M. (2002), \Landing Fees vs Quotas with Uncertain Stocks," Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 43(2), 325-333.
22